FedRAMP Isolation Strategies for Multi-Tenant SaaS

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As the federal government continues to move critical systems into the cloud, SaaS offerings inevitably move to the forefront of digital transformation. These solutions provide the scalability and flexibility these agencies need, even if they introduce unique security challenges. Namely, isolation strategies become paramount when serving multiple tenants, especially in high-security environments.

FedRAMP sets rigorous standards for securing cloud environments aligned with NIST 800-53, and multi-tenant SaaS providers must demonstrate robust separation mechanisms to achieve and maintain authorization.

 

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Practical Implementation of NIST 800-172 Enhanced Security Requirements for CMMC Level 3

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As the cyber threat landscape becomes increasingly dominated by state-sponsored actors and advanced persistent threats, the DoD has taken critical steps to evolve its cybersecurity requirements for defense contractors.

For contractors handling Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) and seeking to achieve CMMC Level 3, the NIST SP 800-172 Enhanced Security Requirements represent the most stringent technical and procedural benchmarks currently required in the Department of Defense (DOD) Industrial Base (DIB).

This article examines the practical application of NIST 800-172 controls, focusing on the advanced security capabilities, resilience engineering, and operational maturity required for high-trust environments.

 

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FedRAMP and FIPS 140-2/140-3 Encryption Validation

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Achieving FedRAMP authorization requires a hardened approach to cryptographic validation beyond shallow ciphers. For CSPs, simply saying that you use AES-256 or support TLS without verified, validated cryptographic modules introduces fatal flaws into authorization efforts. 

To succeed, CSPs must build systems that assume validation is an operational need and not something they do after the fact. They must also recognize that misinterpretations of FIPS requirements can derail otherwise sound security architectures during 3PAO audits or agency reviews.

 

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